

THE MEANING OF NA AND CONDITIONAL WISHES*

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1. Introduction

I discuss a certain type of counterfactual construction of Greek that has the morphology of a conditional, but also conveys the meaning of a wish. Similar constructions are attested cross-linguistically. The Greek construction though, additionally exhibits exclamatory properties. It is of the form *na p, na q* with the subjunctive particle *na* in both the antecedent and consequent clause:

- (1) Na imun plusios, na taksidēva se olon ton kosmo.
NA be.imp.1s rich NA travel.imp.1s in all the world
'If only I were rich, I could/might travel around the world.'

I focus on two key observations: (i) the absence of a conditional connective; (ii) the modalities shown in the translation of example (1), i.e. the wish meaning in the antecedent and the ability or possibility in the consequent. Instead of the typical conditional connective *an*, which resembles in meaning and function the English *if*, we have here the particle *na* in the antecedent. Still, a condition is somehow implied. Regarding the modalities present in the antecedent and consequent, no overt modal operator is present to induce them. Yet, these modalities are part of the meaning of *na p, na q*. The central questions are how the conditionality and the various modalities arise, i.e. which elements induce them, and how such constructions are derived.

To determine the source for these properties of *na p, na q*, I examine the meaning and function of its components. These are: (i) the *na p antecedent*, which is shown to denote a universal wish (section 2.2); (ii) the *na q consequent*, which is found to be existential (section 2.3); and the particle *na* itself, discussed in (2.4). It is shown that this particle does not have a systematic meaning, although it has a systematic function, i.e. to semantically embed a proposition. In section (2.5), I turn to the conditionality of this construction, and show that like the English *if only p, q*, the *na p, na q* construction is indeed a conditional, but crucially unembeddable. I argue that the reason for this is that the desiderative *na p* is exclamatory, and unembeddability is a property of exclamations. Finally, in section (3) I present a syntactic-semantic analysis that generates *na p, na q*, but also gives an account for its complex properties.

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2 The denotations of *na p*, *na q* and its components

2.1 What does a typical CF-conditional look like?

Typically, counterfactual (CF) conditionals in Greek are introduced by the conditional connective *an* ('if') as can be observed in examples (2) and (3).

Iatridou (2000) identifies two types of CF-conditionals: present counterfactuals, where the antecedent and the consequent do not hold at present, as in (2) below; and past counterfactuals, where the antecedent and consequent did not hold at a certain time in the past, and no assumptions are made whether these presently hold (shown in ex. (3)). Similar to English, example (2) means that *the patient is not taking the syrup* and that *he is not getting better*. Example (3) on the other hand, means that *the patient did not take the syrup* and *he did not get better*:

- (2) An eperne afto to siropi, θa yinotan kala.
 If take.imp.3s this the syrup, FUT become.imp.3s well
 'If he took this syrup, he would get better.' (Present CF)
- (3) An ixē pari afto to siropi, θa ixē yini kala.
 If had.3s taken this the syrup, FUT had.3s become well
 'If he had taken this syrup, he would have gotten better.' (Past CF)

As Iatridou notes, the only difference between Greek and English lies in the future morphology. In Greek, the future is denoted by the particle θa , and the verb, the highest verb in the sentence, carries the past morphology. In English, on the other hand, the future is expressed by the modal verb, and thus, as the highest verbal element, it is the one carrying the past morphology.

Similar to the typical CF-conditional *an p*, *q* construction, *na p*, *na q* also denotes a counterfactual condition. Setting aside the modalities of desiderativity and possibility or ability, example (4) is interpreted like (2), i.e. *the patient is not taking the syrup* and *he is not getting better*:

- (4) Na eperne afto to siropi, na yinotan kala.
 NA take.imp.3s this the syrup, NA become.imp.3s well
 'If/ if only he took this syrup, he could/ might get better.'

The tense morphology is similar as well. The verb is either in the imperfect as in (4) or in the past perfect as in (5):

- (5) Na ixē pari afto to siropi, na ixē yini kala.
 NA had.3s take.inf this the syrup, NA had.3s become.inf well
 'If/ if only he had taken this syrup, he could/ might have gotten better.'

Thus, the *na p*, *na q* construction utilizes the same counterfactual conditional

morphology¹. Unlike a typical CF-conditional though, there are additional modalities involved. These modalities are examined next. Since the only difference between the constructions *an p, q* and *na p, na q* is located in the connectives, the additional modalities may be attributable to the particle *na*.

Before we turn to *na p, na q*, I briefly review some of the main properties of *na*. *Na* is traditionally called a subjunctive particle. Although the verb is not morphologically marked with an inflection specific to the subjunctive mood, this mood is assumed to be formed by *na* along with the verb in the so-called non-past form (Philippaki-Warburton, 1984, 1993, Giannakidou 2006, forthcoming)². The non-past is composed of the perfective stem plus the present endings, and does not usually occur in a matrix clause by itself.

Na appears in a variety of clauses. Some are matrix clauses denoting a modality such as that conveyed by a modal verb, or a type of request³:

- (6) Na parume payoto.
 NA take.nonpast.1pl ice-cream
 ‘(Lets/ I want us to) take ice-cream.’

Other types of clauses that *na* appears in are embedded clauses. These may serve as a complement of an attitude verb, a modal, or a perception verb:

- (7) *Skeftomun/ borume* [na ferume tis skines mazi mas].
 Think.imp.1s/ can.1pl NA bring.nonpast.1pl the tents with us
 ‘I was thinking to/ we can bring the tents with us.’
- (8) Ton iða/ akusa [na erxete].
 Him see.aor.1s/ hear.aor.1s NA come.3s
 ‘I saw/heard him coming.’

In conclusion, in main clauses *na* seems to convey the meaning of some modal operator. In embedded clauses, it has no meaning assigned to it. Hence, *na* sometimes appears to behave as a modal and sometimes not. In all cases though, it introduces a clause. Keeping this in mind, we now turn to *na p, na q*.

2.2 The *na p* antecedent

In this section, it is shown that what looks like the antecedent of the CF-conditional *na p, na q* may convey the meaning of a wish. This is the case

¹ The conditional properties of *na p, na q* are discussed in section (2.5).

² It should be noted that *na* immediately precedes the verb, with the only possible interveners the negation and object clitics.

³ For this reason, Giannakidou (2006, forthcoming) suggested that the request should be the default interpretation of main *na*-clauses.

whether *na p* appears by itself, as in (9), or in *na p, na q*, as in (10):

- (9) Na piyename sto kinimatoyrafo mazi tus!
 NA go.imp.1pl to-the movies with them
 ‘If only/ I wish we were going to the movies with them!’
- (10) Na imun plusios, na taksiðeva se olon ton kosmo.
 NA be.imp.1s rich NA travel.imp.1s in all the world
 ‘If only I were rich, I could travel around the world.’

In both of these examples, the *na p* clause expresses the speaker’s wish: in example (9) to go to the movies, and in (10) for richness. If however, the *na p* clause is uttered in contexts undesirable to everyone, including the speaker, the sentence is infelicitous as in English⁴:

- (11) #Na katastrafotan i poli!
 NA destroy.imp.3s the city
 #‘If only/ I wish the city were destroyed!’
- (12) #Na gremizotan to spiti mas, na metakomizame alu.
 NA demolish.imp.3s the house our, NA move.imp.1pl elsewhere
 #‘If only our house were demolished, we could move elsewhere.’

The unacceptability of these examples indicates that *na p* is interpreted in such contexts as a wish. Further evidence for this assumption comes from the optional presence of the exclamatory wish particle *makari*, translated as *I wish* or *if only*. This is possible both with the bare *na p* (ex. 13), as well as the antecedent *na p* (ex.14):

- (13) (*Makari*) na piyename sto kinimatoyrafo mazi tus!
 Exclam.prt NA go.imp.1pl to-the movies with them
 ‘If only/ I wish we were going to the movies with them!’
- (14) (*Makari*) na imun plusios, na taksiðeva se olon
 Exclam.prt NA be.imp.1s rich NA travel.imp.1s in all
 ton kosmo.
 the world
 ‘If only I were rich, I could travel around the world.’

⁴ Note that if the destructive effects are in fact desired by the speaker, then the sentences (11) and (12) are felicitous.

The question is how this wish meaning arises. One possibility is to assume that it results from the past tense. Notice though that a desire can also be expressed with *na* + non-past, i.e. the perfective non-past form:

- (15) Na pame sto kinimatoyrafo mazi tus.
 NA go.nonpast.1pl to-the movies with them
 (lit.) ‘I want us to go the movies with them.’

Similar to example (9) with the verb in the imperfect form, here the speaker also expresses the wish to go to the movies. That is, both share the desirability component. The difference is that while the sentence in (9) denotes a counterfactual wish with the counterfactuality coming from the past tense, the desire in sentence (15) is still realizable, i.e. it is a non-counterfactual wish. Since the wish meaning is present in both examples regardless of the tense, it cannot be attributed to the past tense.

There are two possible sources for the wish meaning: (i) *na*, since it is present in both examples; (ii) or a covert desirability operator, under which the *na*-clause is embedded. If *na* is optative, then we expect all clauses introduced by the particle *na* to be optative. This prediction is not born out: depending on the context, matrix *na*-clauses have different modalities, while the embedded ones none. Hence, if *na* was assumed to be modal, it would not be possible to account for all possible interpretations. As we will see, an approach that uses a (possibly) covert operator can account adequately for the resulting denotations.

Crucially, it is shown here that like *if only p, q*, the *na p, na q* construction can also denote a counterfactual desire expressed by the antecedent *na p*. Building on the semantics of *na p, na q*, this means that the illocutionary force of desire is assigned by a desiderative operator, i.e. a universal quantifier.

2.3 The *na q* consequent

In this section, it is shown that *na q* constitutes a consequent denoting either an ability or possibility.

Before we look at the type of modality denoted by *na q*, it is necessary to examine first, whether *na q* is indeed a main consequent clause. The reason for this is that typically, a *na*-clause preceded by another clause could be construed as its complement clause. One could argue for instance, that example (1) means *I wish/ If only I were rich so as to travel around the world.*

A first test that can be applied to examine whether *na q* functions as a main consequent clause is to check whether *na q* is compatible with the typical antecedent *an p* (*if p*), forming thus *an p, na q*. If this construction is acceptable, this would suggest that *na q* can be a main consequent clause. As shown in the example below, *na q* cannot be interpreted as part of the condition, i.e. as part of the antecedent. In fact, as the translation shows, it can only be

interpreted as the consequent of a conditional. As a further indication, notice also that the anaphoric *tote* (*then*), found in consequent clauses, can be present:

- (16) An imun plusios, (tote) na taksiðeva se olon ton kosmo.
 If be.imp.1s rich then NA travel.imp.1s in all the world
 ‘If I were rich, (then) I could/ might travel around the world.’
 * ‘If I were rich enough to travel around the world...’

Therefore, *na q* is a main clause with the semantics of a consequent.

Interestingly, *na q* only receives an existential interpretation, specified as an ability or possibility. In the following example for instance, assuming that the speaker lives in a country where snow is only possible in December, the speaker wishes for this month, so that there would be a *possibility* of snow:

- (17) Na itan ðekemvris, na xionize liyo.
 NA be.imp.3s December, NA snow.imp.3s some
 ‘If only it were December, it *might* snow a bit.’

The consequent in the following example can only refer to the *ability* of someone to play to piano:

- (18) Na min ixē spasi to xeri tis, na mas
 NA subj.NEG had.3s broken the hand her, NA us
 epeze liyo pjano.
 play.imp.3s some piano
 ‘If only her hand was not broken, she *could* play some piano for us.’

The existential *na q* seems to be in complementary distribution with *θa q*, which raises universal interpretations:

- (19) Na imun plusios, *θa* taksiðeva se olon to kosmo.
 NA be.imp.1s rich, FUT travel.imp.1s in all the world
 ‘If only I were rich, I *would* travel around the world.’

If we assume that *na* is in complementary distribution with the futurate particle *θa*, this would strongly suggest that *na* is a modal, and in particular, an existential quantifier. This though, would be inconsistent with its appearance in the universally quantified wish *na p*. Here, if *na* were a modal quantifier, it should be universal. We return to the role of *na* in the following section.

To conclude for now, it has been shown that *na q* is a main consequent clause denoting an ability or possibility. This means that semantically the conditional should be bound by an existential ability or possibility operator.

2.4 The contribution of *na*

Having shown that *na p* and *na q* have modal interpretations, we now examine the particle *na* itself to determine its contribution to this construction.

As mentioned, *na* occurs in different environments with different meanings. Recall that *na* can introduce a main clause. In this case, different modalities are possible. Depending on the context, these involve attitudes, or meanings usually conveyed by modal verbs. *Na* also introduces embedded clauses, as complements of attitude and modal verbs, but also perception verbs. In such cases, the complement *na*-clauses denote no modality of their own and are similar to the English non-finite clauses. This accords with the fact that there are no non-finite clauses in Greek, and instead of infinitival or participial clauses, the complex *na + verb* is utilized.

In the case of factive verbs, *na* is not allowed. As shown in the following example, only the complementizer *oti* (for ‘that’) is possible:

- (20) Ksero **na*/ *oti* telefonise prin tis ðio.
 Know.1s NA/ that call.aor.1s before the two
 ‘I know (that) s/he called before two.’

Hence, *na*, which introduces non-asserted complement clauses, seems to be in complementary distribution with *oti*. This would suggest that *na* may be a complementizer. On the other hand, we have seen that in consequent clauses, *na* appears to be in complementary distribution with the futurate particle *tha*.⁵

To account for these complex properties of *na*, various analyses have been proposed. Among them, there are three main directions to be distinguished: (i) *na* starts off at T, but moves to the head of a Mood category (MoodP) in the CP system (Philippaki – Warburton 1984, 1993, Alexiadou 1994). (ii) *na* is a complementizer (Agouraki 1991, Tsoulas 1993); (iii) *na* is generated in a structural position above the TP, the so-called Nonveridical Phrase.⁶ It then moves to C, because it may function as a modal subordinator assigning directive illocutionary force (Roussou 2000, Giannakidou 2006, forthcoming).

Let us now consider the function of *na* in the *na p na q* construction. Note that although the meaning of a *na*-clause seems to vary, its core function is basically the same: i.e. to introduce a semantically embedded clause, and in particular to embed a proposition under a modal operator. Hence, what appears to be a main *na*-clause is a proposition embedded under an operator. In the case of the wish *na p* for instance, this operator is a universal desiderative operator, under which the proposition *p* is embedded. Similarly, a complement *na*-clause is also embedded under a modal operator, i.e. the higher verb. In example (21) for instance, the wish meaning is raised by the verb complex *tha iþela* (‘I wish’), and the complement *na*-clause is the embedded proposition:

⁵ See Kyriakaki (2006) for more on the properties of *na*.

⁶ Giannakidou (2006, forthcoming) assumes that nonveridical clauses are the non-asserted clauses, where no inference about their truth can be made.

- (21) *θa iθela* [na anθizan ta luluðia mas].
 FUT like.imp.1s NA bloom.imp.3pl the flowers our
 ‘I wish that our flowers bloomed.’

Hence, in some cases *na* carries no apparent meaning. In others, it seems connected with different modalities. In the case of *na p*, *na q* for instance, the antecedent is interpreted as a wish and the consequent as an ability or a possibility. Thus, *na* does not have a consistent meaning. We conclude from this that the modality should be not contributed by *na*, but rather by another element. In the complement *na*-clauses, the higher verb contributes the modal meaning. In main *na*-clauses, a modal particle can appear. In the wish *na p* for example, we can find the exclamatory wish particle *makari*:

- (22) *Makari na anθizan noritera, na ftjahname stefania.*
 Exclam.prt NA bloom.imp.3pl earlier, NA make.imp.1pl wreaths
 ‘I only (our flowers) bloomed earlier, we could make wreaths.’

Consequently, *na* is not a modal operator. When no overt modal element appears, as in the *na p*, *na q* construction I posit a covert modal operator.⁷ The contribution of *na* in this construction then, is to simply embed the propositions under the modal operators. Hence, we have two main clauses, one denoting a wish, and another a possibility or ability. These are somehow connected in something like a conditional, which brings us to the next question: Is *na p*, *na q* really a conditional?

2.5 *If only p, q versus na p, na q*

So far, we have assumed that *na p*, *na q* forms a conditional. Let us now ask whether this is indeed the case, and in particular, whether it corresponds to the English desiderative conditional *if only p, q*. If these two constructions display the same syntactic-semantic properties, they should essentially share a unified analysis.

Setting aside its optativity, Rifkin (2000) shows that *if only p, q* shares the same conditional semantics as the conditional *if p, q*. The same holds for *na p*, *na q* and *an* (*‘if’*) *p, q*. In example (23) for instance, (a) is true in just those cases where (b) is true: i.e. iff all possible worlds in which I am rich are worlds in which I (can/may/will) travel around the globe:

- (23) a. *Na imun plusios, na taksiðeva se olon ton kosmo.*
 NA be.imp.1s rich NA travel.imp.1s in all the world
 ‘If only I were rich, I could/might travel around the world.’

⁷ We return to the nature of this operator in (2.6).

- b. *An imun plusios, θa taksiðeva se olon ton kosmo.*
 NA be.imp.1s rich FUT travel.imp.1s in all the world
 ‘If I were rich, I would travel around the world.’

Furthermore, Rifkin argues that the consequent in essence expresses the speaker’s ultimate wish and the antecedent the precondition for it. The same is true of *na p, na q*. That is, *na q* constitutes the actual wish, while *na p* is the wish for the means to get to *q*. Consider example (24). If *na q* were reversed with *na p*, then due to its morphological resemblance with *na p, na q* would be interpreted as the wish for the means. Consequently, the sentence would be odd since traveling to the whole world is not easily interpreted as a means to become rich⁸:

- (24) # *Na taksiðeva se olon ton kosmo, na imun plusios.*
 NA travel.imp.1s to all the world, NA be.imp.1s rich
 # ‘If only I traveled to the whole world, I might/could be rich.’

Both antecedents *na p* and *if only p* express a CF-wish. What is more though, both can occur by themselves, in which case the CF-wish is exclamatory. This is particularly evident with *na p*, where the exclamatory wish particle *makari* can be present:

- (25) (Makari) *Na htipuse to telefono tora!*
 (Exclam.pt) NA ring.imp.3s the phone now
 ‘If only the phone would ring now!’

Hence, *na p, na q* and *if only p, q* are alike in most respects. There is however, one fundamental syntactic difference: *if only p* is embeddable, while *na p* is not. According to Rifkin, *if only p* can be bound from the outside (see ex. (26a)), though not by the consequent. This indicates that *if only p* behaves similar to a typical antecedent, even though it should attach higher, since the consequent cannot bind into it. In contrast, the Greek sentence is ungrammatical, and the reason is that *na p* is cannot be embedded. In the case of the typical antecedent *an p* on the other hand, this is perfectly grammatical, when embedded, and thus also bound, as shown in (26b):

⁸The Greek sentence is unacceptable also because of the requirement of *na p* to initiate the construction. This is discussed shortly.

- (26) a. * *Kanenas piratis*, den amfevale oti [na
 no pirate NEG doubt.aor.3s that [NA
 ixē *pro*/*i* *Maria* to harti], θa evriske
 have.imp.3s pro/ the Maria the map], FUT find.imp.3s
 to θisavro.
 the treasure
No pirate, doubted that [*if only he*/*Mary had a map*], he would
 find the treasure.
- b. *Kanenas piratis*, den amfevale oti [an
 no pirate NEG doubt.aor.3s that [if
 ixē *pro*/*i* *Maria* to harti], θa evriske
 have.imp.3s pro/ the Maria the map], FUT find.imp.3s
 to θisavro.
 the treasure
No pirate, doubted that [*if he*/*Mary had a map*], he would find
 the treasure.

To conclude, *na p*, *na q* is similar to the desiderative conditional *if only p*, *q* in all but one aspects: it cannot be embedded. An important question raised then is what induces this syntactic unembeddability. Why is it that *na p*, *na q* is so restricted syntactically?

2.6 The exclamatory properties of *na p*, *na q*

In this section, it is proposed that *na p*, *na q* displays limited syntactic properties because the wish *na p* is exclamatory, and as such, it cannot be embedded.

Support for this claim comes from the desiderative antecedent. As shown below, this is embeddable under any exclamatory particle or interjection:

- (27) *Makari*/ *Ah* na imun plusios, na/ θa taksidheva
 Exclam.prt./ interj. NA be.imp.1s rich, NA/ FUT travel.imp.1s
 se olon ton kosmo.
 to all the world.
 If only I were rich, I could /would travel around the world.

If however, the desiderative *na p*, *na q* is embedded under anything else, such as the verb *θα iθela* (lit. ‘I would like’), then the conditionality disappears. In particular, as can be observed in ex. (28), the antecedent is now simply the complement of the verb, and *na q* a subordinate clause:

- (28) *θa iθela* na imun plusios, na/ (*θa) taksidheva
 FUT want.imp.1s NA be.imp.1s rich, NA/ FUT travel.imp.1s
 se olon ton kosmo.
 to all the world.
 (lit.) ‘I would like to be rich, [so that I could] / [*I would] travel around
 the world.’

Notice also, that in the case of *θa q* the sentence is ungrammatical. The reason is that *θa* does not embed a clause under another, and thus, *θa q* cannot be the complement of the matrix wish clause.⁹

Therefore, similar to the wish *na p*, the desiderative antecedent *na p* also exhibits exclamatory properties. A syntactic property of exclamations is that they are hard to embed. According to Portner and Zanuttini (2003), the reason for their unembeddability, is that they involve an extra CP layer which cannot be selected by a higher head. That is, the syntactic unembeddability of *na p*, *na q* is a result of the selectional restrictions associated with exclamations. A verb like *θa iθela* (lit. ‘I would like’) cannot select an exclamatory CP. An exclamatory particle, on the other hand, e.g. *makari*, comes with this force, and obligatorily selects an exclamatory CP. Consequently, *na p* is found under the scope of an exclamatory operator. Since this operator is in fact desiderative, the resulting meaning of *na p* is that of a wish. In other words, the antecedent *na p* is bound by an exclamatory wish operator. This is spelled out in the presence of a particle, otherwise it is covert.

To summarize this far, *na p*, *na q* constitutes a conditional construction, whose antecedent denotes an exclamatory wish, and its consequent an ability or possibility. The central issue now is to determine the underlying mechanism that derives this type of construction.

3. The syntactic-semantic analysis of *na p*, *na q*

In this section, I present a syntactic-semantic account for *na p*, *na q*. Looking first at the wish meaning, I assume that the wish operator is analyzed similarly to a modal verb, i.e. it first operates on its restriction and then takes a full sentence as its semantic argument. Thus, the structure for the wish *na p*, should be of the following form:

- (29) [[Makari *p*] [IP na imun plusios]]
 Exclam.prt. NA be.imp.1s rich
 (lit.) ‘[[I wish *p*] [IP I were rich]]’.

⁹ Notice that in ex. (30) the English translation with *would* in the following clause is also ungrammatical, unless there is a longer pause involved between the two matrix clauses.

Notice that *na* is positioned low in I (or T), similar to the English infinitival *to*. As we will see shortly, the IP values the variable *p* with the *na*-clause. Here the exclamatory wish operator is overt and is spelled out by *makari*.

With respect to the semantic meaning of the wish operator, I adopt Heim's analysis (1992) for the English *wish*. In her paper, Heim argues that a sentence like in (30) is interpreted as: *John thinks that if you were gone, he would be in a more desirable world than he is in because you are not gone*.

(30) John wishes you were gone.

Building on this paraphrase, she defines **wish** follows:

(31) $c + a$ wishes p , defined only if:
 $\{w \text{ in } c: \text{for every } w' \text{ } \text{Dox}_a(w):$
 $\text{Sim}_{w'}(\text{rev}_p(\text{Dox}_a(w)) + p) <_{a,w} \text{Sim}_{w'}(\text{Dox}_a(w) + \text{not } p)\}$


Briefly, $c + a$ wishes p is the result of conjoining the context c with a wishes p . This is a new context that is created by the successful assertion of the proposition. It constitutes a subset of the world containing the proposition and contains just those worlds where the proposition is true. Dox_a is the function that selects the worlds that are doxastically accessible for a from w , e.g. what the speaker thinks in the world w . Sim_w is the function that selects the maximally similar worlds to the actual world with respect to p , and rev_p is the revision of the common ground c , i.e. a superset of c . When rev_p applies to $(\text{Dox}_a(w)) + p$ the new context is created where, which contains only the worlds where p is true. Hence, the presupposition of p is inherited by the CF-wish.

Setting aside the exclamatory properties of the wish operator for now, it is suggested that the wish operator, overt or not, carries the same semantics for proposed for *wish* by Heim. In *makari na p* ('I wish p ') for instance, when **makari** applies to ***na p***, this is interpreted with respect to a doxastic modal base and its revision: **makari na p** means to find the p -worlds in the revision compatible with one's beliefs that are more desirable than comparable non- p -worlds compatible with one's beliefs.

Turning to the semantics of the conditional *na p, na q*, I adopt the possible world semantics as proposed for conditional by Kratzer (1981, 1986, and 1991). In this framework, the antecedent is found in the restriction of the modal operator of the consequent. The modal operator is sensitive to two context-dependent parameters (doubly relative): (i) a set of accessible worlds, provided by the accessibility function R . This is computed by a conversational background, the Modal Base; (ii) and a partial ordering of the accessible worlds, computed by the Ordering Source. This relation ranks the worlds in the modal base where the antecedent is true according to how close they are to the evaluation world, i.e. it is essentially similar to Heim's *Sim*.

Accordingly, we assume the typical semantics of a conditional, i.e. with the antecedent *na p* in the restriction of the consequent *na q* (see Figure [1]):

[1] The conditional *na p, na q*



In this structure, the operator is an existential quantifier, specified as ability/ possibility, and occupies the head of the CP.¹⁰ This accounts for the existential interpretations of *na p, na q*. The operator first combines with its restriction, i.e. $(\text{Sim}_w((R_w)(p)))$, and then with *q*, its nuclear scope. The particle *na* itself, does not bear any meaning here, and thus, is not calculated in the semantic computation. In sum, the proposed structure in [1] derives the conditional properties of *na p, na q*.


With respect to the exclamatory wish denoted by *na p*, it was suggested earlier that on top of this CP, there is another CP layer. In contrast to Portner and Zanuttini (2003), the head of this CP is not necessarily abstract, but can be spelled out by an exclamatory wish particle. This operator triggers movement of *na p* to the restriction of this higher operator. Before *na p* moves, it leaves a copy behind, which is deleted at PF. In LF it is interpreted as the restriction of the modal operator of the consequent. The wish operator is analyzed similar to a modal, and takes the proposition *na p* as its complement¹¹. The exclamation thus comes about by movement of *na p* to the higher CP.

In all, we get the following structure:

¹⁰ Note that the top node of this structure is conventionally labeled as CP, similar to Portner and Zanuttini's analysis. In semantics, it could simply be S, for sentence.

¹¹ Due to space limitations, the structural representation of the definition of the wish operator is omitted.

[2] The structure of *na p, na q*



4. Conclusions

To conclude, it is shown that the *na p, na q* construction constitutes a case of desiderative conditional with exclamatory properties. In particular, looking at the construction as a whole, as well as its components, it is argued that *na p* constitutes an exclamatory wish, as well as the implicit antecedent of a conditional. *Na q*, the main consequent clause, is interpreted existentially as an ability or possibility. As it is argued, the different modalities are not due to the traditionally called ‘subjunctive’ particle *na*, but due to the existence of a possibly covert operator. Thus, the function of *na* is restricted to introducing a semantically embedded clause.

The *na p, na q* construction resembles the English *if only p, q* in two respects: (i) both of them are first and foremost conditionals; (ii) their antecedents denote a wish. They are shown to differ only in one respect, and this is the unembeddability of *na p, na q*. This syntactic restriction is attributed to a semantic property of the wish *na p*, that of the exclamation. That is, *na p* denotes an exclamatory wish, and as such it cannot be embedded. Structurally, an account of *p* movement is developed, which derives the modalities denoted in this type of constructions.

Thus, an analysis of this sort basically distinguishes between two types of conditional wishes cross-linguistically: The exclamatory ones, which are unembeddable, and the bare ones, which are easier to embed.

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Abbreviations used in glosses:

Aor. = aorist; exclam.prt. = exclamatory particle; FUT = future; imp. = imperfect; inf. = infinitive; interj. = interjection; subj = subjunctive.